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Executive Summary 
 
The concept of extensification was introduced as part of the switch-over to the direct 
payment (DP) system of income support under the MacSharry reforms of the beef regime 
in 1992.  The purpose was to encourage extensive production methods and reduce the 
supply of beef.  
 
The annual revenue from extensification received by Irish cattle farmers in 1999 was £80 
million. A similar amount was received in 1998. This is equivalent to a price increase of 
about 14 pence per kilo carcass weight when allocated to all Irish beef production. If it is 
allocated only to beef produced from the animals eligible for extensification as currently 
administered, namely, males and cull suckler cows, the price equivalent per kilo is of the 
order of 25 pence. 
 
The extensification premium (EP) under the MacSharry reforms operated as a “top-up” on 
the formal applications for the suckler cow (SCP) and the special beef (SBP) premiums.  
The extensification premium was payable on farms when the eligible animals for which 
application was made were collectively stocked at less than 1.4 livestock units (LU) per 
forage hectare.  Under the Agenda 2000 Agreement significant changes in the operation of 
the system were introduced. Under this agreement all animals, whether eligible for the 
premium or not, must be included in the stocking density calculations and heifers, as per 
the regulations, have the same LU weightings as male animals of the same age. 
 
Assuming that the national land base available for beef production remains largely 
constant, then the inclusion of extra animals in the livestock unit calculations under 
Agenda 2000 could have a significant effect on stocking densities and the resulting ability 
to secure revenue from extensification payments. Other studies have shown that direct 
payments, including extensification, are now almost the complete income for Irish cattle 
farmers. Therefore the compliance criteria for DPs including extensification impact 
significantly on the  economics and operation of production systems. Because of the 
growing importance of DPs, including extensification, the primary focus of cattle farmers 
has increasingly shifted from the consumer of beef towards the: 
• compliance criteria for the DPs and  
• containment of production costs within the constraints of the DP compliance criteria. 
 
The extensification options 
 
The stocking density calculations are most acute in relation to extensification as the 
eligibility for this premium relates to the entire herd and not just to individual animals. 
Under the Agenda 2000 agreement, all animals are included in the stocking density 
calculations. Member States were offered a choice of extensification systems with varying 
rates of premiums.  These are: 
• Option 1: a single payment of £79 per Special Beef Premium (SBP) and Suckler Cow   
                    Premium (SCP) collected provided a stocking density limit of 1.4 LU per   
                    hectare is met 
    OR 
• Option 2: with two levels of payment depending on the stocking density 
         £63 at < 1.4 LU per hectare 
         £31.50 between 1.4 and 1.8 LU per hectare. 
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The incentive to extensify production methods under Option 1 is very high, as the EP top-
up has increased to almost 50 percent of the value of the SCP per LU for suckler cows and 
bulls, and to 67 percent of the value of the SBP per LU for steers. These percentages are 
over twice what they were under the MacSharry system. Even under Option 2, the 
incentive is increased significantly where animals are stocked at less than 1.4 LU/ha as the 
top-up ranges from 36 to 53 percent depending on the type of animal. But for animals on 
farms with a stocking rate in the 1.4 to 1.8 range, the incentive to extensify is relatively 
small at between 18 and 27 percent. This is even less than existed on farms that secured 
extensification under the MacSharry system.  
  
Stocking density calculations 
 
Earlier studies have shown that under the MacSharry reforms, Ireland has been much more 
efficient than other member states at “drawing down” both the SBP and extensification. 
This arises due to the extensive nature of the beef production systems used in Ireland. In 
this study the implications of including heifers in the stocking density calculations under 
Agenda 2000 was evaluated. Assuming the land base for cattle production remains 
constant, estimates indicate that the inclusion of heifers increases the LUs and stocking 
density by 44% for the EU-15 but only by 34% for Ireland. For the individual Member 
States, the increase ranges from 22% for Greece to 61% for Luxembourg. The main 
conclusion from an Irish perspective is that the inclusion of heifers will have a greater 
negative impact on the access to extensification for all the other beef producing countries, 
with the exception of Spain, Portugal and Greece. 
 
The capacity of each country to adjust cattle numbers and cohorts to achieve the stocking 
density requirements for extensification under Agenda 2000 was evaluated.  The animals 
most likely to be eliminated would be those not eligible for DPs, like heifers and surplus 
cows. The removal of cows is the most effective mechanism for reducing animal numbers 
as the potential progeny are also eliminated. Estimates show that the removal of a cow 
effectively removes 1.9 LUs in the EU15, but the values range from a high of 2.32 for 
Ireland to 1.37 for Spain. Consequently, the removal of “surplus cows” would have a very 
large impact in making ‘room’ to acquire more extensification revenue in Ireland.  
 
Estimates show that when heifers are included in the calculations and the stocking density 
limit is retained at 1.4, Ireland would have to reduce its cow herd by 10 to 14 percent to 
maintain the same level of access to EPs, in terms of animal numbers. These adjustments 
are based on a 20 percent cow replacement rate that are more typical of other Member 
States. When allowance is made for the more normal dairy and beef cow replacement rate 
in Ireland, about 17 and 12 percent respectively, reductions of the order of 6 and 10 
percent respectively in the cow herds would probably suffice. The impact on all other 
member states would be much greater as they would have to remove two to four times 
more of their cow herd to reach the same target of 1.4.  
 
With the removal of this number of cows, many Member States; namely Greece, Spain, 
Austria, Finland Sweden and Denmark, would not have sufficient cows, two cows per 
SBP, to produce the required number of male animals to “draw-down” their quota of SBP. 
These countries would therefore be trading off SBPs against extensification if they were to 
try to maintain the MacSharry level of access to extensification. The ratio for Ireland 
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would also be restrictive, especially when allowances are made for the calving percentage 
but this problem would also be reduced, but not eliminated, due to the lower cow 
replacement rate in Ireland.  
 
The inclusion of heifers in the stocking rate calculations would cause very little adjustment 
problems for Ireland if the stocking density limit was set at 1.8. But if Ireland were to avail 
of this limit, it would draw a very high proportion of the animals and the cattle farms into 
the administrative ambit of the extensification system. This would greatly increase the 
administrative stranglehold on cattle production in Ireland and also impact severely on 
other farm enterprises.  
 
Estimates indicate that the 1.8 limit would also cause significant constraints for all other 
Member States apart from Greece, Portugal and Spain. The UK, France and Belgium 
could exploit the option of using the replacement heifers for SCP to minimise, but not 
eliminate, the need to shed dairy cows to maintain access to extensification.  
 
Economics of extensification 
 
The economic merits of the two Options for extensification under Agenda 2000 were 
evaluated in relation to their ability to generate revenue and their impact on the 
competitiveness of Irish cattle farming. Under extensification Options 1 and 2 
respectively, Ireland could receive a maximum £257 million or £205 million in 
extensification revenue if all the appropriate animals were stocked on farms at less than 
1.4 LU. Option 1 would give the highest revenue if a high percentage of SCP and SBP 
animals were stocked at less than 1.4, but the lower the percentage of eligible animals in 
this category the greater the benefit from using Option 2.  
 
It is estimated that Ireland would do better under Option 2 when less than 66 percent of the 
animals are stocked on farms at a stocking rate of under 1.4, but all eligible animals would 
have to collect extensification at either the 1.4 or 1.8 level of stocking density.  Option 1 is 
best if more than 66 percent of the animals were stocked on farms with a stocking density 
of less than 1.4 LUs when they claimed their SCP or the SBP. In this situation, option 1 
would provide the added advantage that the remaining animals, up to 34 per cent, and the 
farms on which they reside, could operate outside the administrative and stocking density 
compliance constraints of the extensification system.   
 
At the ‘break-even’ point of 66 percent Ireland would collect £170 million. This could be 
achieved either by collecting £79/head on 66 percent of animals under Option 1 or 
alternatively, under Option 2, by a combination of £63/head on 66 percent of animals and 
£31.50/head on the remaining 34 percent of animals. However, the ‘break-even’ point 
declines rapidly if a significant proportion of the animals under Option 2 fail to collect 
even the £31.50 extensification premium, payable for animals with a stocking density 
between 1.4 and 1.8. For example, the ‘break-even’ point between the options declines to 
almost 50 percent in the event of 20 or more percent of the animals failing to collect the 
£31.50 extensification premium and the total revenue declines to £137 million.  
 
For a range of practical reasons, there will be some slippage in the ability to collect the 
maximum number of extensification premiums. For example, the degree of slippage could  
be related to the ease of compliance with the administrative criteria for the DPs and 
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significance of the DPs, including extensification, in the margins and incomes of the 
farmers concerned.  Earlier work has demonstrated that the DPs account for most of the 
margins and incomes of Irish cattle farmers. With shrinking market-based margins under 
Agenda 2000, the degree of slippage should be relatively low for the basic SCP and SBP. 
But given the administrative complexity of the extensification system itself, with its 
separate method of estimating stocking densities, some slippage would seem inevitable 
with the EPs.  
 
In contrast to Ireland, cattle farmers in other EU countries were shown to be less 
dependent on DPs as they obtained higher prices for beef and the market–based margin 
comprised a greater proportion of their total margin. However this position will be more 
difficult to maintain under Agenda 2000 as beef prices decline and the value of the DPs 
increase. These contrasting revenue structures have significant implications for the 
competitiveness of Irish beef.  
 
 
Selecting the best extensification option 
 
Two of the main factors in determining the best extensification option for Ireland are: 
• the relative ability of the options to deliver revenue from extensification, and 
• the implications of the chosen options for inter-country competitiveness for beef 
production. 
 
An analysis of the situation in Ireland concluded that when a range of factors are taken 
into account it is likely that extensification at the 1.4 limit will be collected on: 
 
• almost all of the SCPs, and  
•  most of the 9 month SBP for male weanlings from the suckler herd, and 
• some of the 22 month SBP, with the exact proportion dependent on the level and 
structure of the live export trade  
 
If the export trade in weanlings continues, many SBP animals may have exited the country 
before they collect the 2nd SBP. Therefore, a very high proportion  (over 66 percent) of the 
SCPs and the SBP animals derived from the suckler herd would collect extensification at 
the 1.4 limit. It is probable therefore that farmers with suckler herds would benefit most if 
extensification Option 1 were selected. 
 
A similar situation will probably prevail on dairy farms with relatively low stocking 
densities. These could trade heifers and young male animals strategically to ensure that the 
stocking densities will be less than 1.4LU. The more heavily stocked dairy farms are most 
likely to have a problem with SBP animals stocked at the 1.4 limit. A small but significant 
realignment of the calf and young cattle trading patterns on these farms could achieve the 
desired result. For example, the more intensive dairy farms could specialise in rearing 
calves but sell the male animals before the 1st SBP was collected and indirectly benefit 
through the selling price from the value of the SBP.  
 
These intensive farms could also specialise in fattening non-DP animals and in finishing 
beef cattle that have already collected their DPs elsewhere.  This way they would avoid the 
production constraints and the entire bureaucracy of the cattle DP system.  
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Maximising revenue 
 
When all factors are considered, it is probable that Ireland would benefit most from the 
Option 1 extensification system. Option 1 would: 
 
• yield the highest revenue for the country 
• target a higher portion of the revenue towards the supply of cattle from the suckler 
herd which are of a higher quality relative to cattle from the dairy herd 
• target more of the revenue towards the poorer regions of the country where extensive 
production systems are already used 
• release the larger dairy farms and market oriented cattle fattening farms from the 
stocking density  requirement  and the administrative bureaucracy associated with the 
DPs and extensification 
• best facilitate the production of quality finished animals for the higher priced beef 
markets within the EU. 
 
In any event, even under Option 2, an increasing number of cattle farmers will aim for the 
1.4 limit to get the higher of the two extensification premiums available. The incentive to 
do this will increase as: 
 
• calves become scarce and expensive as cow numbers decline in response to milk and 
suckler cow quota limits 
• the price of beef declines 
• more farmers opt to join REPS, with its associated compliance criteria 
• more farmers secure off-farm employment which will lead to less labour intensive and 
operationally simpler cattle production systems. 
 
 
Competitiveness 
 
As noted earlier, any incremental relaxation of the stocking density requirements would 
allow more animals in every country to secure extensification.  But there is also a 
significant competitiveness dimension to such changes. Most Member States, apart from 
Ireland, already have limited access to EPs and it would appear that extending the stocking 
density to 1.8 could be of greater advantage to them than it would to Ireland which is 
already much closer to its maximum ‘take’ of extensification revenue. While obtaining 
some extra revenue by opting for the 1.8 limit  Ireland would be compromising part of its 
competitiveness, in the sense of allowing a significant number of non-Irish producers to 
receive higher margins with consequent possible supply increase. As a residual supplier 
Ireland is particularly vulnerable in its beef prices in an oversupplied market.  
 
This situation is further accentuated when the differences in the dependence of Member 
States on market based margins for their incomes from cattle production is taken into 
account. Ireland, due to relatively low beef prices and better access to DPs is less 
dependent on the market based margins. Therefore, unless there is a further divergence in 
the beef prices between Member States under Agenda 2000, the economics of beef 
production in Ireland will be less sensitive to the decline in beef prices that will likely 
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arise due to the reduction in EU price supports.  
 
Should beef prices decline, the greatest economic impact will be on intensive production 
systems with stocking densities in the region of 1.6 to 2.0. If this persisted it would 
discourage production and supplies from these intensive systems and would result in a 
better overall market balance for beef in the EU. This would facilitate and encourage price 
convergence within the EU and it would be a major advantage for Ireland as this country is 
generally considered to be a residual supplier.  In this scenario, Ireland would have the 
twin advantages of both beef price convergence and very high access to DPs, especially 
extensification. Furthermore, future beef supplies would effectively be controlled by the 
low market based margins throughout the EU and the quota system of SCPs and SBPs for 
individual Member States. This would add further stability to the incomes of Irish cattle 
farmers. 
  
To reach this situation Ireland would have to shed animals surplus to quota requirements 
for milk, SCP and SBP but nevertheless, the required adjustments are modest compared to 
other countries.  With the decline in the Irish cattle herd in 1999, most of the required de-
stocking has already taken place and further adjustments would be feasible especially if 
accompanied by a re-alignment of cattle trading and production patterns as outlined above. 
If these adjustments were made, it is probable that up to 70 percent of the Suckler cows 
and a somewhat smaller percentage of the SBPs would collect extensification payments 
under Option 1.  
 
The impact on all other member states would be much greater as they would have to 
remove two to four times more of their cow herd to reach the same target of 1.4. This 
investigation showed that if the relevant adjustments were made, many Member States; 
namely Greece, Spain, Austria, Finland Sweden and Denmark, would not have sufficient 
cows, i.e. two cows per SBP, to produce the required number of male animals to draw-
down their full quota of SBPs. These countries would therefore be trading off SBPs 
against extensification if they were to try to maintain the MacSharry level of access to 
extensification under option 1. As cattle producers in most of the EU countries are more 
dependent than Ireland on the market based margins, reflecting higher cattle prices, the 
incentive to reduce cow numbers to achieve extensification would also be lower.   
 
In conclusion, Ireland may be the only country in the EU that would benefit from using 
Option 1. Undoubtedly, more Irish farmers and animals would collect extensification 
under Option 2 but: 
 
• the overall revenue is likely to be lower  
• the revenue would be more poorly targeted in terms of income support  
• the reward for product quality would be lower (containing more cattle from the dairy 
herd) 
• the administration of the extensification system would be more invasive for cattle, 
sheep, dairying and possibly for cereal producers, and  
• the competitiveness of Irish beef production within the EU would decline. 
 
Since Option 2 is now available it will allow Ireland’s competitors further access to EPs. 
This extra access, even to the lower valued EPs, will be of increasing significance as the 
price of beef declines as envisaged under Agenda 2000. Should Ireland’s competitors 
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become even more successful in capturing EPs, there is also the added complication of the 
“administrative cap” on the EU budget available for extensification. If in the future, the 
budget is exceeded it is probable that the value of the individual EPs will be scaled back 
pro rata. This would certainly not suit Ireland, as it would effectively mean a scaling back 
of EPs in Ireland to finance the EPs for competitors in other countries. 
 
A feature of Option 2 is its ability to suck-in almost all the farms with stocking densities in 
the 1.6 to 2.0 range but yet deliver relatively small economic benefits from extensification. 
Consequently, the compliance criteria for extensification have a significant effect on 
almost the entire Irish cattle herd and for other enterprises such as dairying, cereals and 
sheep.  
 
Both Options use the 1.4 limit, but payment rate is £79 under Option 1 compared to £63 
under Option 2. Therefore, most farmers with stocking rates near the 1.4 limit will aim at 
this figure irrespective of the Option selected Nationally. The logic of the 1.8 limit 
available under Option 2 is difficult to understand.  The methods of computing stocking 
densities for EPs and the basic SCPs and SBPs are different. However, animals aimed at 
the 1.8 limit can scarcely be doing much to achieve extensification if all the animals that 
receive the basic SCP and SBP must first be stocked at less than 2.0 LU. The combination 
of the 2.0 limit for eligibility for the basic premium and the 1.8 limit for extensification, 
could imply that animals are considered to be stocked extensively even if the actual 
stocking density is as high as 90 percent of maximum limit of 2.0 allowed for basic 
premium purposes. (1.8/2.0 x 100). The 1.8 limit could achieve a significant 
extensification effect only if a very high percentage of the eligible animals in the EU were 
concentrated on farms within the extremely narrow stocking rate band of 1.8 to 2.0, which 
seems improbable.  
 
On the other hand it may simply be considered desirable that a very high proportion of the 
eligible animals in the EU should receive an extensification premium. If this is the case, 
then, given the administratively invasive nature of the 1.8 limit, it would have been 
preferable if the related £31.5 extensification premium was administered by increasing the 
value of the basic SCPs and SBPs by the equivalent amount. But, then the payment could 
not be classified as an incentive to extensify.  
 
The economics of extensification are increasingly dependent on the relative scarcity of 
eligible animals and land. As the price of beef declines and the value of the DPs increase, 
much of the value of the DPs becomes capitalised into the factors specified in the 
compliance criteria, namely eligible animals and land. This progressively pushes out the 
non-eligible or non-DP animals (cows surplus to quotas, heifers, male animals that have 
already collected their SBPs, lambs over 6 months), and low-DP animals (non-replacement 
beef heifers).  
The number of eligible animals will also decline as the market-based margin shrinks, and 
perhaps even becomes negative. This may occur because of falling beef prices and rising 
costs. The rise in costs in turn is both driven by the capitalisation process and accentuated 
by it. Trying to maintain farm incomes by increasing the value of the EPs, which are also 
tied to the shrinking pool of eligible animals further increases this capitalisation process on 
the animals. 
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FOREWORD 
 
The inherent nature of cattle farming with its long production cycle makes it difficult to 
control and predict beef supplies and prices. In Ireland, these inherent characteristics are 
further complicated by being heavily influenced by EU beef policy in relation to income 
support and export trading conditions. Major EU policy changes over the last twenty years 
have affected  the export competitiveness of Irish beef. The WTO agreement in 1994 and 
the more recent international financial crises, especially in Russia, have severely 
constrained Irish beef exports to traditional and evolving markets in third countries. 
Various food safety issues, in particular the BSE crisis, have further accentuated the 
market imbalance in the EU. The decline in consumption combined with the re-
nationalised EU beef market has impacted most severely on Irish beef. 
 
Teagasc, in conjunction with University College Dublin, has initiated research to establish 
how Ireland could develop a more strategic approach to the evolution of a single EU beef 
market. A number of joint working papers have been prepared on various aspects of EU 
policy for beef and their implications for cattle prices, direct payments and farm income in 
Ireland. To facilitate public discussion on these very important topics it has been decided 
to publish these working papers. The authors of the working papers invite comments and 
observations on their analysis and conclusions. 
 
 
Liam Downey 
Director,  
Teagasc. 
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Development of a Strategic Approach for a Single EU 
Beef Market 
 
Working Paper No. 6:  
August, 2000 
 
Extensification 
 
An Analysis of National and Competitive Issues 
 
Liam Dunne and Ultan Shanahan, Teagasc 
John O’ Connell, University College Dublin. 
 
The concept of extensification was introduced as part of the  switch-over to the direct 
payment (DPs) system of income support under the MacSharry reforms of the beef 
regime in 1992.  The purpose was to encourage extensive production methods and 
reduce the supply of beef.  
 
The increasing importance of the DPs as a form of revenue for Irish cattle farmers was 
demonstrated in working paper No. 4. In working paper No. 5 it was shown that cattle 
farmers in Ireland have become more and more reliant on DPs for their margins and 
income. Other research has demonstrated that direct payments are already a major 
component of the margins in cattle production and they have also provided a major 
stabilising influence on margins and incomes for cattle farmers in recent years (Dunne 
1998a and 1999a).   
 
Under Agenda 2000 it is envisaged that there will be a further reduction in the price of 
beef and a related increase in the value of the direct payments. In this situation the value 
of the direct payments could even exceed the total margin from cattle production on 
many Irish farms i.e. some of the direct payment is used to pay production costs.  This 
situation has already been reached for the Irish beef sector in its entirety (Dunne 2000). 
Therefore, the ability to access the direct payments, including extensification, is of 
increasing importance to the economic viability of cattle farmers.  
 
The total annual revenue from extensification received by Irish cattle farmers in 1998 
and 1999 was about £80 million. This is equivalent to a price increase of about 14 pence 
per kilo carcass weight for all beef produced. If this revenue is compared with the beef 
produced by the animals eligible for extensification as currently administered, males 
and cull suckler cows, the price equivalent per kilo would be of the order of 25 pence. 
 
Because of the growing importance of DPs, including extensification, the primary focus 
of cattle farmers has shifted from the beef consumer towards: 
• the compliance criteria for the DPs, and  
• the containment of production costs within the constraints of the DP compliance 
criteria. 
 
Stocking density is the major compliance requirement in addition to the need to possess 
“eligible” animals. The stocking density requirement is most acute in relation to a 
farmer’s entitlement to extensification. 
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This paper focuses on how the stocking criteria for extensification impact on: 
• inter-country competitiveness in beef   
• the optimum stocking density limits for Irish cattle farmers 
• the structure of the various cattle cohorts in Ireland 
• the marginal cost of retaining certain animals on farms seeking extensification 
• the marginal value of land on farms seeking extensification 
• the incentive to trade animals between farms 
• the likely producer response to changes in the stocking density criteria. 
 
Stocking Density 
The extensification premium (EP) under the MacSharry reforms operated as a “top-up” 
on the applications for the suckler cow (SCP) and the special beef (SBP) premiums.  
The extensification payment was payable on farms when the eligible animals applied for 
were collectively stocked at less than 1.4 livestock units (LU) per hectare. Following 
the BSE problems in 1996, an even larger extensification premium was introduced for 
farms where the stocking density was less than 1 LU. This latter development is of 
limited interest in Ireland and it is ignored in this report to reduce the complexity of the 
analysis. 
 
In calculating the stocking density for beef cattle under the MacSharry reform, the area 
devoted to cattle production was determined as the total area farmed less that used for 
other enterprises like tillage, sheep and milk. Unlike the common farm management 
practice, there is no adjustment for land quality in the calculations of stocking densities 
for extensification.  
 
The LU calculations for extensification under the MacSharry system were based on the 
animals used in the applications for SCPs and SBPs and their age at that time of the 
application. These were converted into LUs using the following coefficients: 
• male animals over 6 months but under two years are rated at 0.6 LUs 
• male animals over two years and suckler cows are weighted at 1 LU.  
 
In this system there could have been a significant number of “hidden LUs” on many of 
the farms that qualified for extensification payments. These could have included: 
 
• animals under 6 months did not feature in the stocking density calculations  
• male cattle that had already collected their premium (SBP) on other farms 
• eligible (SBP) male animals which might be sold to other farmers before their 
eligibility expired but these could collect the premium on the farm of purchase 
• cows in excess of quotas for both milk and SCP 
• all heifers, since these were not eligible for premiums and were also excluded from 
the LU calculations. 
• ewes in excess of ewe premium quotas 
• all other sheep. 
 
Under the Agenda 2000 Agreement significant changes in the operation of the system 
were introduced. Under this agreement all cattle and sheep must be included in the 
stocking density calculations and heifers have the same LU weightings as male animals 
of the same age. Assuming that the land base available for beef production remains 
largely constant, the inclusion of these extra animals in the livestock unit calculations 
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could have a significant effect on stocking densities and the ability to secure 
extensification payments. 
 
The current weightings for the different animals and the main criteria used for 
calculating the stocking densities for extensification are summarised in Table 1. Unlike 
the MacSharry reforms, the aim under Agenda 2000 is to include all animals in the 
calculations. This will eventually be achieved by using the animal register for each 
farm, which records all births, deaths, sales and purchases. The future plan is that the 
relevant information will be available via the electronic database from the Cattle 
Movement Monitoring System (CMMS) being developed by the Department of 
Agriculture, Food and Rural Development.   
 
Table 1: Extensification Premiums and Livestock Units 
 
Extensification MacSharry Agenda 2000 
Animal 
Type 
Premium 
payable 
Animals 
included 
Weighting 
LU 
Animals 
Included 
Weighting 
LU 
 
Dairy cows No quota or all 1.0 All 1.0 
Beef cows Yes only, SCP 
applications 
1.0 All 1.0 
Replacement 
heifer  
(suckler herd) 
yes, under 
Agenda 
2000  
 
Zero 
 
0 
up to 20% 
of SCP 
applications 
0.6  
if < 24 
months and 
not calved 
Male > 24 
months 
Yes only, SBP 
applications 
1.0 All 1.0 
Male 6 to 24 
months 
Yes only, SBP 
applications 
0.6 All 0.6 
Female > 24 
months 
No Zero 0 All 1.0 
Female 6 to 
24 months 
No Zero 0 All 0.6 
Male and 
female < 6 
months 
 
No 
 
Zero 
 
0 
 
Zero 
 
0 
Ewes  
No 
only, ewe 
premium 
applications 
 
0.15 
only, ewe 
premium 
applications 
 
0.15 
Lambs No Zero 0 Zero 0 
Notes: SCP = suckler cow premium 
SBP = special beef premium,  payable on male (steer) beef animals at 10  and 22 months under MacSharry but under agenda 
2000 the age is reduced by one  month to 9 and 21 months.      
 
 
Until the complete register is available, a series of five censuses per year will be taken 
on each farm and this will be used to estimate the LUs for extensification payment 
purposes. Because the census relates to five specific dates which are not known in 
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advance it may be very difficult for the farmers to accurately plan their production 
systems, livestock numbers and their eligibility for extensification payments. Since the 
revenue involved is substantial, the interim system with its post hoc census dates could 
easily precipitate panic sales and trading in cattle towards the end of the year when 
farmers are in a better position to establish their actual stocking densities relative to 
their requirements for extensification.  
 
The overall impact could be a further increase in inter-farm trading of animals, as cattle 
farmers respond to their stocking density situation. Some of this extra trading and the 
possible panic selling could be avoided if the census dates were fixed in advance and 
better forward planning could prevail. As far as the individual farmer’s entitlements to 
extensification payments are concerned, it probably matters little whether the cattle are 
traded to comply with pre-planned or post hoc census dates but panic trading could be 
avoided with the pre planned dates. Fortunately, pre planning will become easier once 
the CMMS data base, becomes operable and all the days of the year will be used for 
calculating the stocking density and not just the post hoc census dates. Then, farmers 
will be better able to manage their herds to optimise their entitlements and incomes. 
 
Because the direct payments, including extensification, are now almost the complete 
income for Irish cattle farmers, the related compliance criteria severely compromises the 
economics of production systems (see working paper No. 5). The stocking density 
calculations are most acute in relation to extensification where the premium relates to 
the entire herd and not just to individual animals. 
 
Premium rates 
As already noted, the extensification premium (EP) operates as a “top-up” on the 
applications for the suckler cow (SCP) and the special beef (SBP) premiums and under 
MacSharry reforms the EP was payable on farms when these animals were collectively 
stocked at less than 1.4 livestock units (LU) per hectare. Following the BSE problems in 
1996, an even larger extensification premium was introduced for farms where the 
stocking density was less than 1 LU. This latter development is of limited interest in 
Ireland and it is ignored in this report to reduce the complexity of the analysis. Also in 
1996, a separate SBP system at a higher premium rate was introduced for Bulls, but 
only one bull premium could be collected during the animal’s life as compared to the 
two SBPs for steers. This was also of limited relevance to Ireland. 
 
Under the Agenda 2000 agreement all animals are included in the stocking density 
calculations, as outlined in Table 1. Also under the agreement, Member States were 
offered the choice of extensification systems with varying rates of premiums: 
 
• Option 1: a single payment of £79 with a stocking density limit of  <1.4 LU 
 OR 
• Option 2: with two levels of payment depending on the stocking density 
• £63 at < 1.4 LU 
• £31.50 between 1.4 and 1.8 LU 
 
Since the EP is essentially a “top-up” payment on the basic SBP and SCP when the 
appropriate stocking density limits are achieved, the ability to collect as many SBPs and 
SCPs as possible is prerequisite to maximising extensification revenue. Maximising EP 
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revenue depends on the size of EP itself, and the stocking rate adjustment needed to 
comply with the standard. The stocking rate adjustment calculations are in turn 
influenced by the stocking density weightings for the animals involved as specified in 
the legislation, (see Table 1). 
 
On farms where stocking rates are critical for access to EP, it should be possible to 
collect the SBP while the male animals are under 2 years and therefore rated as 0.6LU. 
This gives male animals a considerable advantage over suckler cows as these are always 
rated as 1.0 LU.  The exception here is the use of the maiden heifer facility to collect up 
to 20 percent of the SCPs. If the heifers are under two years at the time of application 
for the SCP they are rated at 0.6 LU.  But, once they produce a calf, even if they are less 
than 24 months old, they are rated at 1.0 LU. 
 
It is noteworthy that the EP top-up is on the basic SCP or SBP and these are paid out on 
eligible animal applications for these premiums. But, access to the EP depends on the 
stocking density on the farm as an entire unit as measured from the cattle register for 
each farm at the five census dates, or, in the future by the annual average from the 
Department’s data base for each day of the year. Therefore, a farmer in seeking to gain 
access to extensification must optimise the stocking densities by having regard to the 
weightings of the animal cohorts at both: 
• the time of application for the basic premiums (SCP or SBP), and  
• the appropriate (EP) census dates throughout the year.  
 
If the applications for the basic SBP takes place once the animals reach the appropriate 
age the main restriction for extensification is likely to be the age and LU weightings at 
census dates. The presence of heifers, and to a lesser extent cows and ewes surplus to 
the quotas, on the farm could be critical for access  to extensification as the LUs of these 
animals are also taken into account.    
 
The financial incentive of the top-up arising from the EP for suckler cows and male beef 
animals are summarised in Table 2. To allow for the different weightings for male beef 
animals and suckler cows the values for the EP are expressed both on a per animal and  
LU basis in Table 2.   
 
Two options for the suckler cow are shown, the basic SCP and the additional national 
premium (NP) component which may be financed totally by the EU or by the National 
Government depending on the region concerned. To date the most relevant column for 
suckler cows in Ireland is the SCP + NP but the basic SCP is also presented to complete 
the picture. Similarly, the appropriate SBP data are presented for both steers and bulls.  
In practice, the most relevant options are: almost exclusively steers in Ireland and bulls 
for Continental countries.  
 
Under the MacSharry system, the value of SCP per animal compares very favourably 
with the value of the SBP, even for bulls (Table 2). However when the value of these 
premiums are expressed on an LU basis the male animals under two years are a much 
more attractive mechanism for accessing DPs.  
 
With the EPs, the rate per animal is the same for both suckler cows and male animals 
but the value of the EP per LU is much higher for male animals. The percentage top-up 
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arising from the EP varies from approximately 21 percent for suckler cows (SCP+NP) 
to 32 percent for SBP steers. 
 
The narrowing of the difference in the value between the SCP and the SBP per animal 
under Agenda 2000 has further increased the differential per LU in favour of the male 
animals, especially for bulls. For animals farmed at low stocking densities (<1.4 LU/ha) 
there was also a two to three fold increase in the value of the EP.  
 
 
Table 2 Premium rates 
 SCP1 SCP+NP2 SBP3 
steers 
SBP3 
bulls 
 
MacSharry     (1992 to 1999) 
Basic premium    (£/ animal) 114 133 86 106 
Basic premium     (£/ LU) 114 133 143 177 
 
Extensification Premium (EP) 
 
@  < 1.4 LU/ha4    (£/animal) 28 28 28 28 
@  < 1.4 LU/ha      (£/LU) 28 28 47 47 
% “top up” on basic premium 24.6 21.1 32.3 26.4 
 
 
Agenda 2000     (2002 to 2007) 
Basic premium £/animal 158 177 118 165 
Basic premium £/LU 158 177 197 275 
 
EP option 1  
 
@  < 1.4LU/ha    (£/animal) 79 79 79 79 
@  < 1.4 LU/ha      (£/LU) 79 79 132 132 
% “top up” on basic premium 50.0 44.6 66.9 47.9 
 
EP option 2 
 
@  < 1.4 LU/ha        (£/animal) 63 63 63 63 
@  < 1.4 LU/ha         ( £/LU) 63 63 105 105 
% “top up” on basic premium 39.9 35.6 53.3 38.2 
 
@ 1.4 to 1.8 LU/ha   (£/animal) 
 
31.5 
 
31.5 
 
31.5 
 
31.5 
@ 1.4 to 1.8 LU/ha      (£/LU) 31.5 31.5 53 53 
% “top up” on basic premium 19.9 17.8 26.7 19.1 
1       Suckler Cow Premium, basic 
g       Suckler Cow Premium including  National top up 
2 Special beef Premium 
4        In 1996, a larger extensification premium was introduced  where the stocking density was less than 1 LU. This is of limited 
interest in Ireland and it is ignored in this report to reduce the complexity of the analysis 
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The incentive to extensify production under option 1 is very high as the EP top-up has 
increased to almost 50 percent of SCP/LU for suckler cows and bulls and to 67 percent 
of SBP/LU for steers. Even under option 2, the incentive is increased significantly 
where animals are stocked at less than 1.4 LU/ha as the top-up ranges from 36 to 53 
percent depending on the type of animal. But for animals on farms with a stocking rate 
of 1.4 to 1.8 the incentive to extensify is relatively small, between 18 and 27 percent, 
which is even less than existed on farms that secured extensification under the 
MacSharry system      
 
Extensification under the MacSharry Reforms 
Under the MacSharry reforms, Ireland has been much more efficient than other member 
states at “drawing down” the SBP and extensification payments (Dunne 1997,  
O’Connell et al 1999). This arises due to the nature of the beef production systems used. 
Dunne (1997)  demonstrated that over 80% of Irish male cattle collect the 22 month 
special beef premium (SBP22) while producers in most of the EU obtain this premium 
on less than 40% of male cattle. Even in the UK, with similar beef systems to those in 
Ireland, producers were found to collect premia on only 61% of male cattle. 
 
In relation to extensification, Dunne (1997) also demonstrated that the capacity to avail 
of the top-up itself was also highest in Ireland where over 70% of the SBP and almost 
90% of the SCP animals collected this premium. The ability to claim extensification on 
the basic SBP in the UK and France was about 90% that for Ireland but in many of the 
other member states it was only about 30%. The ability to claim extensification on SCPs 
was almost as high in both France and the UK as it was in Ireland but in Germany it was 
less than 70% of the Irish rate. 
 
These findings have fundamental implications in relation to any adjustments to the 
stocking rate requirements for extensification. From a statistical perspective, any 
incremental relaxation of the stocking density requirements will allow more animals in 
every country to secure the premium.  There is, however, a competitiveness dimension 
to such changes. If the incremental change relates to the top end of a declining curve or 
the last few percent of the animals, as in Ireland, then the proportionate gain is relatively 
small. But if the incremental change relates to the bottom end of a rising curve, as in 
Member States that already have limited access to EPs, then the proportionate gain can 
be substantial. Since the actual shape of the stocking density curve for each Member 
State is not available it is not possible to provide accurate estimates of the changes in 
competitiveness arising from an incremental change in the stocking density 
requirements. Nevertheless, the differences between the Member States can be taken 
into account in evaluating proposed changes in the compliance standards. For example, 
the simple objective of aiming to obtain EPs on all animals while desirable in itself may 
not be the best long term option for Ireland. 
  
Extensification under Agenda 2000 
Assuming that the land base devoted to cattle production remains approximately the 
same under Agenda 2000, the ability to collect extensification should decline when all 
animals are included in the LU calculations. It is difficult to make an accurate 
assessment of the likely impact of including all animals due to lack of data. The 
historical data on stocking density collected from the DP applications by individual 
farms under the operation of the MacSharry system is of limited use, even if it could be 
 8
accessed for each Member State. This arises because this data does not indicate the: 
• degree to which individual farms in each country failed to qualify for extensification 
under the MacSharry criteria 
• degree to which farmers omitted land parcels that were surplus to requirements to 
qualify for extensification at 1.4 LU per hectare 
• degree of strategic purchases and sales of animals practised by farms close to the 
stocking density limits 
• degree of un-exploited capacity arising from the stocking rate penalty of  0.4 LU 
arising from delay in applying for the SBP until the animal was over 2 years (0.4 = 
1.0 - 0.6)  
• degree of un-exploited capacity by farmers to adjust their production systems  
• lack of data on the number of  “hidden animals” of various types on individual farms 
in each member state (see page 2) 
• degree to which the revenue from extensification payments could contribute to the 
overall margins derived from cattle production in each member state. 
 
 
Inter-country Comparisons 
While recognising that the premiums must be “drawn down” by specific animals on 
individual farms, it is possible by using census data to estimate the overall impact for 
each member state of including extra animals in the LU calculations. The main 
categories of extra animals included in the stocking densities under Agenda 2000 were 
outlined earlier in relation to Table 1.  The most significant groupings were heifers, 
cows surplus to quota requirements and male animals over two that have already 
collected their DPs. It is assumed, for the purpose of this report at least, that for farms 
interested in extensification the male animals over two years will have either been sold 
onto farms not involved in extensification or slaughtered/exported. 
 
It is possible to obtain estimates of the impact on stocking densities of the inclusion of 
heifers and surplus cows by using a combination of: 
• the cattle census data for each country, and  
• converting the animal numbers into LUs with both the MacSharry and Agenda 2000 
premium livestock unit coefficients. 
 
The resulting impact on stocking densities of including heifers is evaluated in this 
section based on the December 1997 cattle census data. Discussions relating to surplus 
cows are deferred to the next section under the title “adjusting to the new criteria”.  
 
The consequences for the stocking densities for each Member State of including female 
animals are summarised in Table 3. The actual increases in LUs are presented in column 
(a) and the corresponding percentage increase is shown in column (b).  These show that 
all countries are affected but to varying degrees.  
 
Assuming the land base does not change, this data indicates that the inclusion of heifers 
increases the LUs and stocking density by 44% for the EU-15 but only by 34% for 
Ireland. For other countries, the increase ranges from 22% for Greece to 61% for 
Luxembourg. The main conclusion from an Irish perspective is that the inclusion of 
heifers will have a greater negative impact on the access to extensification for all the 
other beef producing countries, with the exception of Spain, Portugal and Greece. 
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To maintain the same degree of access to extensification in terms of cattle numbers 
receiving payment, under Agenda 2000 as existed under MacSharry, it is estimated that 
the stocking density limits would have to increase from 1.4 to the figures shown in 
column (c ) of Table 3.  For Ireland, the limit would need to increase to 1.9, but Greece, 
Portugal and Spain could accommodate a somewhat lower figure. In contrast, most of 
the other member states would require the limit to be set at 2.0 or higher (Table 3).   
 
Table 3: The Inclusion of Heifers in Livestock Units 
 
Country 
 
Inclusion of Heifers @  
1.4 LU/hectare limit 
 
Required 
limit1 
 
Inclusion of Heifers @  
1.8 LU/hectare limit 
 LU increase
(000) 
(a) 
% increase 
 
(b) 
LU/Ha 
 
( c ) 
Excess 
LU (000) 
(d) 
Excess as % 
of Total LU
(e) 
Greece    74 22 1.7     -22 - 5 
Portugal   204 25 1.7     -31  -3 
Spain   831 26 1.8     -82  -2 
Ireland 1405 34 1.9    218  4 
Italy 1499 39 1.9    417  8 
Austria   495 41 2.0    164 10 
Finland   240 39 2.0      70   8 
Sweden   409 45 2.0    170 13 
UK 2786 46 2.0  1183 13 
Germany 3858 49 2.1    307 19 
Netherlands   957 49 2.1    459 16 
France 5304 49 2.1  2587 16 
Denmark   551 53 2.2    307 19 
Belgium   852 60 2.2    553 24 
Luxembourg     62 61 2.3      41 25 
 
EU15 
 
19529 
 
44 
 
2.0 
 
 7639 
 
12 
Source: Author’s estimates based on 1997 cattle census data  
1 The estimated national stocking rate required to accommodate all heifers  
 
In the Agenda 2000 proposals of March 1998, the stocking density limit was retained at 
1.4 despite the requirement to include all animals in the calculations. But in the final 
agreement, in 1999, Member States were offered the choice of extensification systems: 
 
• Option 1: a single payment of £79 with a stocking density limit of 1.4 LU 
 OR 
• Option 2: a system with two levels of payment depending on the stocking density 
• £63 at < 1.4 LU 
• £31.50 between 1.4 and 1.8 LU 
 
For both options there was a phasing-in period of two years allowed, therefore, the 
complete new system would not be operable until 2002. For the purpose of this report 
the phasing-in period is ignored in the interest of simplicity and clarity. 
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The estimated impact of setting the stocking density limit at 1.8 can be seen in the last 
two columns of Table 3. These show that Greece, Portugal and Spain could actually 
increase their livestock numbers by 5, 3 and 2 percent respectively and yet draw down 
extensification payments on the same proportion of cattle which pertained under the 
MacSharry situation. Alternatively, they could maintain their livestock numbers but 
secure extensification payments on a higher proportion of their cattle. All other 
countries would have to reduce their overall LUs to be able to draw down 
extensification payments on the same proportion of cattle as obtained EPs under the 
MacSharry system. Of these, Ireland would only have to shed 4 percent of its total LUs 
(218,000 LUs), but the remaining countries would have to shed between 2 and 6 times 
this amount. Setting the limit at 1.8 would therefore provide some gain in 
competitiveness for Ireland in relation to access to extensification revenue.  This is 
important especially when there is an overall EU budget limit on extensification 
payments.  
 
 
Adjusting to the new criteria 
If, under Agenda 2000, the objective was to maintain the degree of access to the same 
number of EP’s as under MacSharry, then the number of LUs in most countries would 
have to be reduced. A strategic shedding of various types of animals in relation to their 
stocking density capacity to collect DPs could give the following ‘shedding’ scenario:  
 
1.  cows surplus to the quota requirements for milk and SCP. 
2.   heifers > 2 years and in excess of cow replacement requirements 
3 males > 2 years that could have already collected their SBP 
4 suckler cows within the SCP quota up to 20 percent of the quota, by availing of the 
20 percent replacement heifer facility for the SCP. 
 
The situation with heifers is rather complex as a number of premium situations can 
arise. Under Agenda 2000, there is the option of substituting replacement heifers for 
suckler cows, at a rate up to 20 percent, in the applications for SCP. Beef type heifers 
are eligible for a slaughter premium under the “national envelope” payment system but 
there is no stocking density requirement for this premium. In general, heifers do not 
collect DPs and consequently they are likely to be the most vulnerable, especially those 
over 2 years (equivalent to 1 LU) and not required as replacement heifers. 
 
Males over 2 years, with a weighting of 1 LU, would also be vulnerable as these 
animals could already have collected the second SBP at 21 months under Agenda 2000.  
They could then be either moved onto farms not collecting extensification, slaughtered 
or exported live to other countries. 
 
The removal of cows that are surplus to both milk and SCP quotas would have a large 
impact on LUs and stocking densities. The removal of a cow reduces the LUs not just 
by its own 1 LU but also the LUs associated with the potential progeny. This could be 
very significant, especially where long duration beef production systems are practised as 
in Ireland. The impact of removing cows is illustrated in Table 4 which shows the 
number of LUs per cow for each country under both the “MacSharry” and “Agenda 
2000” criteria. 
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These estimates show that, under Agenda 2000, the removal of a cow effectively 
removes 1.9 LUs from the EU15 cattle herd, but the values range from a high of 2.32 for 
Ireland to 1.37 for Spain. Consequently, the removal of “surplus cows” would have a 
very large impact in making ‘room’ to acquire more extensification revenue in Ireland. 
In practice, the removal of cows would have a somewhat lower impact than the values 
presented in Table 4 because the least productive cows in terms of their ability to 
produce progeny would be removed first. 
 
Table 4 Livestock Units per Cow 
 
Country 
 
LU per Cow (1) 
 “MacSharry” 
(Cows + Males)  (2) 
 
“Agenda 2000” 
(Cows + Males + Females) (2) 
Greece 1.22 1.49 
Portugal 1.27 1.58 
Spain 1.09 1.37 
Ireland 1.74 2.32 
Italy 1.40 1.94 
Austria 1.36 1.91 
Finland 1.47 2.05 
Sweden 1.45 2.10 
UK 1.40 2.04 
Germany 1.38 2.05 
Netherlands 1.12 1.66 
France 1.26 1.88 
Denmark 1.27 1.95 
Belgium 1.24 1.99 
Luxembourg 1.31 2.11 
 
EU15 
 
1.33 
 
1.92 
Source: Author’s estimates based on 1997 cattle census data  
(1) Estimated using LU coefficients as specified for premium purposes in Table 2. 
(2) Over 6 months of age. 
     
The Capacity to Adjust to the 1.4 Limit 
The numbers of LUs that would have to be removed in each country to achieve the 
stocking rate target of 1.8 were shown in Table 3. Estimates were made of the types of 
animals and the extent to which they would have to be removed to achieve the 1.4 limit, 
the results are shown in Table 5 for two scenarios.  
 
The data in column (a) and (c) are based on the assumption of an annual cow replacement 
rate of 20% for both dairy and beef cows. The second scenario, columns (b) and (d), shows 
the implications of a 20% replacement rate for dairy cows but with an apparent zero rate 
for beef cows. The apparent zero rate for beef cows represents the full exploitation of the 
20% heifer facility for claiming the SCP which is available under Agenda 2000. In a 
biological and husbandry sense the beef cows are replaced at a 20% rate but this is done 
by substituting heifers up to the 20% limit of beef cow numbers as allowed for in SCP 
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applications.  
 
To achieve the 1.4 limit it would be necessary for all countries to remove the following 
categories of animals: 
• all heifers > 2 years (after allowing for cow replacements as outlined) 
• all male animals > 2 years after they have collected the 2nd SBP 
• suckler cows surplus to the quota requirements for SCP 
• a percentage of the cows as shown in columns 2 and 3 of Table 5. 
 
The data in Table 5 show that the cow herd in the EU15 would have to be reduced by 24 to 
28 percent depending on the replacement strategy chosen. Ireland would have to reduce its 
total cow herd by 10 to 14 %, but the impact on all other member states would be much 
greater as they would have to remove two to four times this amount to reach the same 
target of 1.4 LU/ha. 
 
Table 5: Animals removed to achieve the 1.4 limit 
Country Cows removed as % of Remaining Cows per SBP Quota 
  
Total cows
 
 
(a) 
Total Cows but 
using  20% 
replacement 
Heifers for SCP1 
(b) 
 
Total cows 
 
 
(c ) 
Total Cows but 
using  20% 
replacement 
Heifers for SCP1  
(d) 
Greece 32 37 0.88 0.97 
Portugal 18 24 2.53 2.73 
Spain 14 22 1.17 1.51 
Ireland 10 14 1.92 2.01 
Italy 23 26 2.86 2.98 
Austria 34 37 1.21 1.26 
Finland 35 36 1.03 1.04 
Sweden 28 31 1.61 1.67 
UK 24 29 2.16 2.29 
Germany 31 33 2.09 2.13 
Netherlands 37 38 2.58 2.64 
France 21 26 3.22 3.47 
Denmark 36 38 1.81 1.85 
Belgium 24 28 2.79 3.01 
Luxembourg 20 24 2.99 3.14 
 
EU15 
 
24 
 
28 
 
2.20 
 
2.33 
Source: Author’s estimates based on 1997 cattle census data  
1Under Agenda 2000, there is the option of substituting replacement heifers for suckler cows, at a rate up to 20 percent,  for SCP 
applications. 
When cows are removed their potential progeny are also eliminated. If the reduction was 
large enough, there could be insufficient eligible male animals available  to “draw down” 
the individual Member States full quota SBP and, the related extensification premium, if 
applicable, would also disappear. To evaluate this possibility, the estimated ratio of the 
“remaining” cow numbers to the SBP quota for each Member State is presented in the 
final two columns of Table 5.  
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In compiling these estimates, the cow numbers were first adjusted to take into account the 
significant number of young beef animals that are slaughtered as veal. These animals 
would therefore not collect the SBP  in any event and they would also not affect stocking 
densities as they would be slaughtered under six months. It was assumed that the cows that 
produce the veal calves and the calves themselves would  be farmed totally independent of 
the SBP and extensification system. 
 
The estimates in Table 5 indicate that many Member States, (Greece, Spain, Austria, 
Finland Sweden and Denmark) would not have sufficient cows, two cows per SBP (on the 
basis of 50/50 male and female progeny), to produce the required number of male animals 
to draw-down their quota of SBP.  The ratio for Ireland would also be restrictive, 
especially when allowances are made for the calving percentage. This would also mean 
that if Ireland was to fill its milk quota, the average milk yield for dairy cows would have 
to increase by in excess of 20 percent. This would require yields of over 1,000 or 1,100 
gallons per cow depending on the beef cow replacement option chosen. This may be 
difficult but not impossible as most of the cows eliminated would be those with low yields 
which would quickly raise the average yield of the remainder.  Also, the estimates for 
overall livestock numbers are based on a cow replacement rate of 20 percent, while this 
may be low for some countries it would be high for Ireland. A more typical replacement 
rate for a static dairy and beef cow herd in Ireland would be about 17 and 12 percent 
respectively. With such replacement rates, the removal of cows in Ireland as outlined in 
Table 5 could be scaled back to between 6 and 10 percent depending of the degree of use 
of the replacement heifer option chosen for the SCP. This would ensure that the overall 
cow numbers would be at least double the SBP quota.  
 
In summary, Ireland would have to reduce its cow herd by 10 to 14 percent to maintain the 
same level of access to EPs, in terms of animal numbers, when heifers are included in the 
calculations and the stocking density limit is retained at 1.4. In practice, cow herd 
reductions of the order of 6 and 10 percent respectively would probably suffice when 
allowance is made for the more normal dairy and beef cow replacement rate of about 17 
and 12 percent, respectively.  
 
In any event, as the value of the DPs increase and the price of beef declines under Agenda 
2000, there will inevitably be some restructuring of the cattle herd either through early 
slaughter or export of non-DP and low value-DP animals in Ireland. In addition, there is 
the possibility that under Agenda 2000, cattle farming will attract land out of both cereals 
and sheep enterprises but for different reasons (see Dunne 1999c).  
 
The impact on all other member states would be much greater as they would have to 
remove two to four times more of their cow herd to reach the same target of 1.4. Many 
Member States; namely Greece, Spain, Austria, Finland, Sweden and Denmark, would not 
have sufficient cows, two cows per SBP, to produce the required number of male animals 
to draw-down their quota of SBP. These countries would therefore be trading off SBPs 
against extensification if they were to try to maintain the MacSharry level of access to 
extensification. The ratio for Ireland would also be restrictive, especially when allowances 
are made for the calving percentage but this problem would also be reduced, but not 
eliminated, due to the lower cow replacement rate in Ireland. 
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The Capacity to Adjust to the 1.8 Limit 
The numbers of LUs that would have to be removed in each country to achieve the 
stocking rate targets of 1.8 were presented earlier in Table 3. Estimates of types of animals 
and the extent to which they would have to be removed to achieve the 1.8 limits are shown 
in Table 6. The estimates presented in Table 6 do not include the option to avail of the 20 
percent heifer facility for claiming SCPs.  
 
Since the number of LUs which have to be shed are much smaller than for the 1.4 limit, 
there can be a greater degree of selectivity of the types of animals shed. Greece, Portugal 
and Spain would already be within the limit and therefore no adjustment is required. 
Ireland has only a very small adjustment to make and this could be accommodated by 
shedding; 
• all of the two year old heifers that are surplus to the 20 percent replacement rate, and  
• 35 percent of the male animals that are over 2 years old. 
 
All of the other countries would have to shed a significant percentage of the cow herd, 
mainly because they do not have many: 
• surplus heifers, exceptions are France, Belgium and Luxembourg 
• male animals over 2 years, except for the UK, France, Italy and to a lesser extent 
Germany  
• suckler cows in excess of SCP quota, except for UK, France and Belgium. 
  
   Table 6  Animals removed to achieve the 1.8 limit 
Country Animals removed % Remaining Cows 
 Surplus 
Replacement 
Heifers 
 
Males 
> 2 
Surplus 
Suckler 
Cows 
 
Other 
Cows 
  
Per SBP quota 
Greece 0 0 0 0 2.01 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 3.72 
Spain 0 0 0 0 4.11 
Ireland 100   35 0 0 2.23 
Italy N/a 100 100 4 3.87  
Austria N/a 100 n/a 8 1.81 
Finland N/a 100 n/a 7 1.55 
Sweden N/a 100 100 11 2.12 
UK N/a 100 100   8 2.79 
Germany N/a 100 100 14 2.69 
Netherlands N/a 100 100 15 4.87 
France 100 100 100   9 4.05 
Denmark N/a 100 100 19 2.36 
Belgium 100 100 100 15 3.43 
Luxembourg 100 100 100 12 3.47 
 
EU15 
 
N/a 
 
100 
 
100 
 
  8 
 
2.91 
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 Source: Author’s estimates based on 1997 cattle census data  
  N/a = none available 
 
Each of these countries would have to shed between 5 and 20 percent of their cow herd to 
maintain their chances of reaching the 1.8 target. This is unlikely to be a realistic option 
as dairy cows with  probably much higher margins would have to be eliminated just to 
collect extensification.  It is likely that a more viable alternative to retain access to 
extensification for the UK, France and Belgium is the option of using the replacement 
heifers for SCP. Even with the full exploitation of this option it would still be necessary to 
shed some dairy cows.  
 
The data in the final column of Table 6 shows that in any event, Finland and Austria 
would not be able to retain sufficient cows to provide enough male animals to exploit 
their SBP quota. Therefore, aiming for the extensification premium becomes 
progressively irrelevant if a significant number of SBPs have to be sacrificed.  
 
In summary, the inclusion of heifers in the stocking rate calculations would cause very 
little adjustment problems for Ireland if the stocking density limit is set at 1.8. But if 
Ireland were to avail of this limit, it would draw not only a very high proportion of the 
animals and nearly all the cattle farms into the extensification system. This would greatly 
increase the administrative stranglehold on cattle production in Ireland with severe 
consequences for the types of animals produced (see Dunne 2000 and working paper No. 
5).  
 
The 1.8 limit would still cause significant constraints for all other member states apart 
from Greece, Portugal and Spain. The UK, France and Belgium could exploit the option 
of using the replacement heifers for SCP to minimise, but not eliminate, the need to shed 
dairy cows to maintain access to extensification. 
 
The Best Extensification Option 
As noted earlier, the Agenda 2000 proposals of March 1998 retained the stocking density 
limit at 1.4 despite the requirement to include all animals in the calculations. But in the 
final agreement a year later Member States were offered the choice of extensification 
systems: 
 
Option 1: a single payment of £79 with a stocking density limit of 1.4 LU 
 
Option 2: two levels of payment depending on the stocking density  
• £63 at < 1.4 LU 
• £31.50 between 1.4 and 1.8 LU 
 
The maximum revenue that Ireland could derive from extensification under options 1 and 
2 are presented in Table 7 and Figure 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 16
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 Maximum revenue from extensification 
Stocking density Option 1 Option2 Difference 
(option 1 – option2) 
Percent of 
SCPs and SBPs 
at < 1.4 LU/ha 
 
 
IR£ million 
10 26 113 -87 
20 51 123 -72 
30 77 133 -56 
40 103 144 -41 
50 129 154 -25 
60 154 164 -10 
70 180 174 6 
80 206 185 21 
90 232 195 37 
100 257 205 52 
Source: Author’s estimates 
 
 
The following discussion does not take into account the impact of either extensification 
option on a range of consequential adjustments. These include:  
• the transaction costs and disease risks associated with any increase in the volume of 
inter-farm trading of animals 
• the revenue lost that could arise from the market based margin of the animals that 
might be eliminated  
• the feed cost savings that could arise for the lower number of animals that might be 
retained as a result of the lower stocking densities  
• the loss of revenue that could arise from any decline in the slaughter or export value of 
“unfinished” animals which might be sold prematurely to avoid stocking density 
penalties and thereby encountering a price discount 
• the loss of revenue that could arise through price discounting of  “older” (>30 months) 
animals in some age sensitive markets. 
 
 
 
The revenue values shown in Table 7 assume the complete exploitation of extensification 
on the entire quota for both the SCP and the SBP animals.  Under extensification options 1 
or 2 respectively, Ireland could receive £257 million or £205 million if all the appropriate 
animals were stocked on farms at less than 1.4 LU. Table 7 shows that option 2 would give 
the highest revenue if less than 60 percent of  the SCP and SBP animals were on farms 
with a stocking density below 1.4 when they collected their basic premiums. The lower the 
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percentage of eligible animals in this category the greater the benefit from extensification 
payments from using option 2. 
 
 
Figure 1 demonstrates that Ireland would do better in terms of extensification payments 
under Option 2 if less than 66 percent of the animals are stocked on farms under 1.4, but 
all eligible animals would have to collect extensification.  Option 1 is best if more than 66 
percent of the animals were stocked on farms with a stocking density of less than 1.4 LUs 
when they claimed their SCP or the SBP. At the “break-even” point of 66 percent, Ireland 
could secure £170 million. However, as Figure 1 shows, the break-even point declines 
rapidly if a significant proportion of the animals under option 2 fail to collect even the 
£31.50 extensification premium which is payable for animals with a stocking density 
between 1.4 and 1.8. For example, the break-even point between the options declines to 
almost 50 percent in the event of 20 or more percent of the animals failing to collect the 
£31.50 extensification premium and the total revenue declines to £137 million. 
  
 
Failure to collect extensification could arise through a combination of circumstances, 
which include: 
• animals collecting SCP or SBP when located on farms with a stocking density in excess 
of 1.8, are not eligible to collect extensification 
Figure 1. Choice of Extensification 
system
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• animals not being entered for the basic SCP or SBP for various reasons (no area aid 
application submitted or on small farms with less than 15 LUs).  
• animals stocked on farms with a stocking density greater than the 2 LU/ha limit for the 
basic SCP or SBP, these cannot even collect the SCP or SBP would therefore be 
excluded from extensification 
• animals exported (mainly weanlings) before they have collected one or both SBPs, 
consequently  extensification would not arise  
• administrative errors relating to the applications for either the basic SCP or SBP or 
extensification itself  
 
Therefore, in practice there could be some slippage in the ability to collect the maximum 
number of extensification premiums. The degree of slippage could also be related to the 
ease of compliance with the administrative criteria for the DPs and significance of the 
DPs, including extensification, in the margins and incomes of the farmers concerned. 
Working paper No. 5 showed that the DPs accounted for most of the margins and incomes 
of Irish cattle farmers. With shrinking market based margins the degree of slippage should 
be relatively low for the basic SCP and SBP. But given the administrative complexity of 
the extensification system itself some slippage is inevitable with the EPs.  
 
In contrast to Ireland, cattle farmers in other EU countries were less dependent on DPs as 
they obtained higher prices for beef (working paper No. 4). The higher prices for beef 
resulted in a greater reliance by producers in these countries on the market based margins 
and less on the DPs for their income (Murphy et al 1999).  But this position will be more 
difficult to maintain under Agenda 2000 as beef prices decline and the value of the DPs 
increase. The implications of the contrasting revenue structures for the competitiveness of 
Irish beef will be discussed later. 
    
Selecting the best option 
The analysis earlier in this paper demonstrated that Ireland would have little difficulty 
adjusting to the 1.8 limit. Considerable but not insurmountable adjustment would be  
required to achieve the 1.4 limit. Nevertheless, the adjustment problems for either option 
would be much greater for most other Member States than for Ireland. Two of the main 
factors in determining the best extensification option for Ireland are: 
• the relative ability of the options to maximise revenue from EPs, and   
• the implications of the chosen options for inter-country competitiveness for beef. 
 
There was a sharp decline in cattle numbers, including cows, in Ireland in 1999. The 
probability is that there will be further reductions in stocking rates as cattle farmers adjust 
to all the aspects of Agenda 2000 and more farmers avail of REPS. In the future it is 
probable that over 60 percent of the SCP and SBP animals will be targeted at the high EP 
with a stocking density limit of 1.4, irrespective of the extensification options chosen at 
National level.  
 
Given the inherent nature of suckler beef production in Ireland and its high concentration 
of suckler cows in the “western counties” the stocking limit of 1.4 will be attainable for a 
number of reasons. If the existing strong export trade in weanlings is maintained it will 
remove animals earlier from these farms and further assist in this endeavour. Another 
option would be the selling-on of weanling heifers once they begin to cause stocking 
density problems. It will also be easier to aim for the 1.4 limit due to the bringing forward, 
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by one month, of the SBP payments under Agenda 2000.  For example, farms stocked at 
one suckler cow per hectare, could retain all their weanlings for almost 11 months and yet 
collect the SCP, plus the SBP at 9 months and extensification on both.  They could also 
collect the same premiums on an even lower land base if the weanlings were sold earlier. 
From a stocking density perspective it would be best to sell the male weanlings once they 
reach 9 months, with the SBP collected, and the females before they reach 6 months. This 
would result in stocking density of 1.15 LU/ha for the cow and the male weanling and 1.0 
LU/ha for the cow and the female weanling, (cow = 1LU, female calf = 0LU, male calf for 
9 less 6 = 3/12  months x 0.6LU = 0.15LU).  On average the stocking density would be 
1.075LU/ha or expressed in another way the cow and its average progeny could be 
maintained on 0..768  hectares  (1.075/1.4) and yet secure extensification for both the SCP 
and SBP at 9 months.  
 
On the farms where stocking rates are critical, there is also the possibility of purchasing 
replacement heifers from specialised farms rather than rearing them or even using the 20 
percent replacement heifer option for the SCP. If the export trade in weanlings continues 
to grow there may not be sufficient SBP animals available to “draw down” the full quota 
of SBPs, especially for the 2nd SBP. Again these animals are more likely to have moved 
out of the suckler cow territory thereby making it easier for suckler cows to remain within 
the 1.4 limit.  
 
A further feature of the implementation of the Agenda 2000 was the doubling of the 
premium limit, from 90 to 180, per farm for the 9 and 21 month SBP. This latter facility is 
likely to be advantageous to the larger cattle fattening farms and should increase the 
demand for SBP eligible animals in the suckler cow regions, and consequently their 
market price. The added incentive to move out these animals will further enhance the 
likelihood that farmers with suckler cows will aim for the 1.4 limit. 
 
When all these factors are taken into account it is likely extensification at the 1.4 limit will 
be collected on: 
• almost all of the SCPs, and  
• probably most of the 9 month SBP for male weanlings from the suckler herd, and 
• at least a portion of the 21 month SBP on the progeny before they are two years old.  
 
This portion of the 21 month SBP animals under the 1.4 limit could be substantial  when 
account is taken of the combined effect of: 
• the increase in the export trade in weanlings  
• the reduction in the numbers of sheep, and 
• the extra area available due to a reduction in the area devoted to cereals.   
 
If the export trade in weanlings continues many SBP animals may have exited the country 
before they collect the 21 month SBP.  This would have the effect of further increasing 
the percentage of the SBP animals below the 1.4 limit. Therefore, a very high proportion  
(over 66 percent) of the SCPs and the SBP animals derived from the suckler herd would 
have collected extensification at the 1.4 limit. It is probable that farmers with suckler 
herds would have benefited most if extensification option 1 had been selected. 
 
A similar situation will probably prevail on dairy farms with relatively low stocking 
densities. These could trade heifers and young male animals strategically to ensure that 
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the stocking densities will be less than 1.4LU. The SBP animals that are most likely to 
have a problem with the 1.4 limit are likely to be those on the more heavily stocked dairy 
farms. A small but significant realignment of the calf and young cattle trading patterns on 
these farms could achieve the desired result.  
 
The more intensive dairy farms, many often restricted from expansion by the lack of extra 
milk quota, could adjust their cattle enterprise and specialise in rearing calves and sell the 
male animals before the 1st SBP was collected.  Such farms could then: 
 
• avail of  ‘cheap surplus milk’ to feed and rear the calves 
• have the added benefit of a reduced calf mortality due to less trading of  the animals in 
their most vulnerable period (see Fallon, 2000) 
• indirectly avail of a significant portion of the DPs which would be capitalised into the 
calf-weanling price (see Dunne et al, 1998) 
• operate their dairy enterprise outside the administrative constraints of the cattle 
payment system  
• develop a replacement heifer enterprise which would supply dairy cow replacements to 
other dairy farms and possibly even “cross bred” cow replacements for suckler farms 
that are operating within the extensification system 
• operate a specialised heifer or even a ‘non DP’ cattle fattening enterprise which would 
be driven by market based margins and targeted directly at consumer markets.  
 
The specialised dairy type farms would then trade the ‘eligible’ animals onto the more 
extensive cattle farms before they collect the SBPs. Here, they would be better placed to 
avail of the higher level of extensification payment.  
 
Under this scenario, the SBP weanling type animals from heavily stocked dairy herds, and 
possibly also from some suckler herds, would be traded onto extensive rearing farms at 
somewhat inflated values due to the capitalisation of DPs into eligible animal prices. The 
animals could remain on these extensive rearing farms until they have collected the 9 and 
21 month SBPs and related extensification. But, before they are two years old, and rated as 
a full LU for stocking density calculations, they would be traded on to fattening farms or 
exported live to other countries.  
 
On entering the fattening farms, the prices of these animals would be somewhat 
discounted due to the de-capitalisation of the values of SBPs and the related EPs which 
have already been collected on the rearing farms.  Like the intensive dairy farms, these 
specialised cattle fattening farms would be operating outside the DP system and would be 
free to use stocking densities that are compatible with market based margins. They would 
therefore be very responsive to both factory and consumer prices in relation to degree of 
finish and quality of the beef produced.  For these reasons it is highly desirable that some 
farms at least remain outside the administrative ambit of the extensification system. 
 
The financial incentive for the individual farmer to either shed specific animals or rent in 
land will be evaluated in working paper No. 7. The implications of the choice  of 
alternative extensification options on the revenue distribution among the different types of 
farms in Ireland will be evaluated in a further working paper in this series.  
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Maximising revenue 
When all the above factors are considered, it is probable that in excess of 66 percent of the 
eligible animals in Ireland would be stocked at less than 1.4 LU per hectare when they 
collected their SBPs and SCPs.  Therefore, as shown in Table 7 and Figure 1, Ireland 
would maximise the revenue from EPs by availing of the Option 1 extensification system.  
 
The benefits from using Option 1 could be sumarised as follows: 
• yield the highest revenue for the country from extensification payments 
• target a higher portion of the revenue towards the supply of cattle from the suckler herd 
which are of a higher quality relative to cattle from the dairy herd 
• target more of the revenue towards the poorer regions of the country where extensive 
production systems are used 
• release dairy farms and market oriented cattle fattening farmers from administrative 
bureaucracy associated with the DPs and extensification. 
 
In any event to get the higher extensification premium even under Option 2, an increasing 
number of cattle farmers will aim for the 1.4 limit. The incentive to do this will increase 
as: 
• calves become scarce and expensive 
• the price of beef declines 
• more farmers join REPS, with its associated compliance criteria   
• more farmers secure off-farm employment which will lead to less labour 
intensive and operationally simpler production systems. 
 
Competitiveness 
As already noted, Ireland would have to make only relatively minor stocking rate 
adjustments to achieve the 1.8 stocking density limit for extensification using Option 2 
under Agenda 2000. This effectively means that the proportion of animals receiving EPs 
would be similar to that which prevailed under the MacSharry system. The figures 
presented in Table 8 show that Ireland was particularly successful in securing EPs even as 
far back as 1994 when cattle prices and market based margins were reasonably good 
compared to the last few years of the decade.  
 
Unfortunately, it has not been possible to locate more recent figures for the percentage of 
animals receiving EPs in the various countries.  Despite being somewhat dated, these 
figures show that compared to the other countries, Ireland was at the top of the league in 
collecting extensification revenue, but France and the UK were also major users of the 
EPs.  
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Table 8  Animals collecting extensification in 1994 
Country Percent collecting extensification on: 
 Suckler Cows 
(SCP) 
Special Beef Premium 
(SBP) 
Greece n/a n/a 
Portugal 72.7 19.4 
Spain n/a n/a 
Ireland 88.6 71.8 
Italy 23.3 18.4 
Austria n/a n/a 
Finland n/a n/a 
Sweden n/a n/a 
UK 81.6 65.6 
Germany 59.3 19.9 
Netherlands n/a n/a 
France 85.2 62.9 
Denmark n/a n/a 
Belgium n/a n/a 
Luxembourg 82.0 84.3 
 
EU15 
 
n/a 
 
n/a 
Source:  Dunne (1997) 
n/a = no data available 
 
 
 
As noted earlier, any incremental relaxation of the stocking density requirements would 
allow more animals in every country to secure extensification.  But there is also a 
significant competitiveness dimension to such changes. If the incremental change relates 
to the top end of a declining curve or the last few percent of the animals then the 
proportionate gain is relatively small. The data in Table 8 indicates that this is the situation 
in Ireland for the 1.8 limit.   
 
In contrast, if the incremental change relates to the bottom end of a rising curve then the 
proportionate gain could be substantial. As the figures in Table 8 indicate most Member 
States, apart from Ireland, already have limited access to EPs and are in this situation.  It 
would appear therefore that extending the stocking density to 1.8 could be of greater 
advantage to other Member States as they have more limited access to extensification than 
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Ireland.   
 
Even if Ireland were to maximise its revenue under extensification option 2, which appears 
unlikely, the country would appear to be trading part of its competitiveness just to secure 
this extra revenue by opting for the 1.8 limit.  This situation is further accentuated when 
the differences in the dependence of Member States on market based margins for their 
incomes from cattle production is taken into account. Ireland, due to relatively low beef 
prices and better access to DPs (working papers No. 4 and 5) is less dependent on market 
based margins. Therefore, unless there is a further divergence in the beef prices between 
Member States, the economics of beef production in Ireland will be less sensitive to the 
decline in beef prices that will likely arise due to the reduction in EU price supports. 
Should beef prices decline, it will have greatest economic impact on intensive production 
systems, i.e. stocking densities in the region of 1.6 to 2.0. If this persisted it would 
discourage production and supplies from these intensive systems and this would result in a 
better overall market balance for beef in the EU. This would likely precipitate price 
convergence within the EU, which would be a major advantage to Ireland.  In this 
scenario, Ireland would have both beef price convergence and very high access to DPs, 
especially extensification. Furthermore, future beef supply would effectively be controlled 
by the low market based margins throughout the EU and the quota system of SCPs and 
SBPs for individual Member States.   
  
Apart from the issue of competitiveness, it does seem difficult to justify the use of the 1.8 
limit. As the earlier calculations in Table 3 showed, the 1.8 limit could be justified as a 
measure to accommodate the inclusion of heifers which had been excluded in the stocking 
density calculations for the MacSharry limits of 1.4.  
 
Even allowing for the different methods of computing the stocking densities for EPs and 
the basic SCPs and SBPs, animals stocked to the 1.8 limit could scarcely be considered 
extensive if all the animals that receive the basic SCP and SBP must first be stocked at less 
than 2.0 LU.  The combination of the 2.0 limit for eligibility for the basic premium and the 
1.8 limit for extensification, could imply that animals are considered to be stocked 
extensively even if the actual stocking density is as high as 90 percent of maximum limit 
of 2.0 (1.8/2.0 x 100). For example, over half the animals in the EU could be expected to 
qualify for extensification unless the average stocking density in the EU was at least 1.8.  
Even if the average stocking density was 1.8, then half the animals would secure 
extensification but the other half must be concentrated in the extremely narrow stocking 
rate band of 1.8 to 2.0.  This would appear improbable given the diversity of cattle 
production systems throughout the EU and the experience under the MacSharry system as 
outlined in Table 8.   
 
The number of calves in the EU is severely constrained by the controls on cow numbers 
through the quotas for both milk and SCPs. The number of extensification premiums is 
controlled by the pre-requirement to secure either a SCP or SBP and the numbers of both 
of these are also controlled by quotas. When all these restrictions are combined with small 
and declining market based margins, the likelihood of any expansion in cattle numbers 
seems remote even where stocking densities are in the 1.8 to 2.0 range. This further 
undermines the logic of paying an extensification top-up on animals where they are 
stocked at a density of 1.8 which is as high as 90 percent of the maximum limit of 2.0 for 
the pre-requisite SCP and SBP payments.  This issue becomes more incomprehensible in 
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the context of an overall EU budget limit for extensification under Agenda 2000 
agreement.  
 
Irrespective of whether extensification option 1 or 2 is being considered, the real problem 
for the future is the number of animals that are likely to be below the stocking limit of 1.4.  
It is difficult to establish the extent of the decline in the percentage of SCPs and SBPs 
collecting EPs at 1.4 when all animals are included in the stocking density calculations 
under Agenda 2000. The analysis outlined earlier in this report would suggest that Ireland 
would have to shed animals surplus to quota requirements for milk, SCP and SBP but 
nevertheless, the adjustments were modest compared to other countries.  With the decline 
in the Irish cattle and sheep herds in 1999 most of this de-stocking has already taken place. 
Further adjustments would be feasible especially if they were accompanied by a re-
alignment of cattle trading and production patterns as outlined above. If these adjustments 
were made, it is probable that up to 70 percent of the suckler cows and a somewhat smaller 
percentage of the SBPs would collect extensification under Option 1.  
 
As outlined earlier in relation to the data in Table 5, the impact on all other member states 
would be much greater as they would have to remove two to four times more of their cow 
herd to reach the same target of 1.4. If the relevant adjustments were made, many Member 
States; namely Greece, Spain, Austria, Finland, Sweden and Denmark, would not have 
sufficient cows, two cows per SBP, to produce the required number of male animals to 
draw-down their quota of SBP. These countries would therefore be trading off SBPs 
against extensification if they were to try to maintain the MacSharry level of access to 
extensification under option 1. As already noted, cattle producers in most of the EU 
countries are more dependent than Ireland on the market based margins which in turn 
reflect higher cattle prices. This would also lessen the incentive to reduce stock numbers to 
achieve extensification.   
 
In conclusion, Ireland may be the only country in the EU that would benefit from using 
Option 1. Undoubtedly, more Irish animals and farmers would collect extensification 
under Option 2 but: 
• the overall revenue is likely to be lower (see  Table 7, Figure 1, and related discussion)  
• the revenue would be more poorly targeted in terms of income support  
• the reward for product quality would be lower (output would contain more cattle from 
the dairy herd) 
• the administration of the extensification for cattle would be more invasive in farming 
activities as it would involve more cattle and cattle farms, and other farm enterprises 
such as sheep and possibly even dairy farming, and  
• the competitiveness of Irish beef production within the EU would decrease  due to a 
reduction in the  margins relative to competitors. 
 
Unfortunately, as the Agenda 2000 negotiations progressed, Option 2 became a reality and 
this will allow Ireland’s competitors further access to EPs. As already shown in Figure 1 
and Table 7, countries with relatively low levels of access to extensification benefit most 
from Option 2. For these countries this extra access, even to the lower valued DPs, will be 
of increasing significance as the price of beef declines as envisaged under Agenda 2000. 
Should Ireland’s competitors become even more successful in capturing EPs, there is also 
the added complication of the “administrative cap” on the EU budget available for 
extensification. If in the future, the budget is exceeded it is probable that the value of the 
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individual EPs will be scaled back pro rata. This would certainly not suit Ireland as it 
would effectively mean a scaling back of EPs in Ireland to finance EPs in other countries. 
 
In the implementation of extensification for the year 2000, Ireland like the other member 
countries choose to use option 2.  Apart altogether from the inter-country competitiveness 
aspects arising from the choice of the two options, this report suggests that option 1 may 
have been a better choice for Ireland. For the future this choice is still open. But before 
any change is made, the benefits in terms of the overall revenue from extensification and 
the distribution implications require a more detailed evaluation. It is planned to examine 
these aspects in future working papers in this series. 
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APPENDIX    List of Abbreviations 
 
Agenda 2000 Extensification system in the period 2002 to 2007 
CAP  Common Agricultural Policy 
DPs Direct Payments 
EP Extensification Premium 
LU Livestock Unit 
MacSharry system  Extensification system in the period 1992 to 1999 
REPS Rural Environment Protection Scheme 
SBP Special Beef Premium 
SCP Suckler Cow Premium 
 
 
 27
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 28
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 29
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
